Video: The ‘graduate’ reveals the complicity of former president of Mexico, Felipe Calderón and El Narco

Video: The ‘graduate’ reveals the complicity of former president of Mexico, Felipe Calderón and El Narco

Before Genaro García Luna was arrested in December 2019 by the United States government, stories around the collusion of the Federal Government of Mexico with drug cartels to allow free transfer were considered myths and even conspiracies.Neither the detention nor the imprisonment of five governors linked to drug trafficking, nor the processing of another 12 in the last seven years, gave the certainty that there was a federation that grouped the lords of the drugs: a hypothesis that they raised, at the expense ofYour physical integrity, some journalists.

However, the capture of García Luna, the former powerful deputy director of the National Security and Security Research Center (Cisen) in the Government of Vicente Fox Quesada, and head of the Ministry of Public Security (SSP) in that of Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, speaksof another reality: a truth that, although it was already suspected, is difficult to understand by its cruelty.His arrest ran the curtain of the political theater of the absurd: he exposed Mexican surrealism, typical of a black novel where the culprit of the murder is the butler, the peaceful and silent figure that moves on the stage of the crime without any suspicion,Because he is in charge of caring for the house.

The formal signaling of the US government, finished in the statement of drug trafficker Jesús Zambada García, aka the 'king', reveals that the 'graduate' - known in that way García Luna between various heads of the drug cartels - received between 2005 and2007 bribes for at least eight million dollars in exchange for allowing the free operation of the Sinaloa cartels and the Beltrán Leyva brothers.This not only shook the Mexican political system, but also increased the animosity towards the ruling class, a feeling increasingly rooted in the tired Mexican society, which stopped trusting the political class.

The founded doubt of Mexicans about the private behavior of their rulers, mainly because of their links with drug trafficking groups, has not been fortuitous.The cases of judicial processing of the former governors - Jorge Torres López, of Coahuila;Eugenio Hernández Flores and Tomás Yárrington Ruvalcaba, from Tamaulipas;Jesús Reyna García, from Michoacán, and Mario Villanueva Madrid, of Quintana Roo - all accused of allowing cartels to in their states during their governments, already pointed towards the moral insolvency of the political system.Even so, it was still doubting, in a blind hope, of the infiltration of the narco in the structures of the federal government.

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The Mexican society also did not end up convincing the degree of infiltration of organized crime despite the suspicions of illicit enrichment and money laundering that led to the imprisonment of a long list of other former governors, indicated of high corruption: Roberto Borges Angulo, from Quintana Roo;Javier Duarte de Ochoa and Flavino Ríos Alvarado, from Veracruz;Guillermo Padrés Elías, from Sonora;Andrés Granier Melo, from Tabasco, or Luis Armando Reynoso Femat, from Aguascalientes.Or, the criminal proceedings initiated against Roberto Sandoval Castañeda, of Nayarit;César Duarte Jáquez, from Chihuahua;Rodrigo Medina de la Cruz, from Nuevo León;Fidel Herrera Beltrán, from Veracruz;Miguel Alejandro Alonso Reyes, from Zacatecas, or Fausto Vallejo Figueroa, from Michoacán.

Until then it was supposed that corruption cancer had only touched the structures of state and local governments.At least this was what the arrests of 16 mayors occurred during the six -year term of Enrique Peña Nieto, which were imprisoned for the presumption of their links with organized crime cells and drug cartels: Érick Ulises Ramírez Crespo and César Miguel Peñaloza Santana, from Cocula, Guerrero; Juan Mendoza Acosta, from San Miguel Totolapan, Guerrero; José Luis Abarca, from Iguala, Guerrero; Salma Karrum Cervantes, from Pátzcuaro (dead in prison), Michoacán; Dalia Santana Pineda, from Huetamo, Michoacán; Archímides Oseguera, by Lázaro Cárdenas, Michoacán; Jesús Cruz Valencia, from Aguililla, Michoacán; Enrique Alonso Plascencia, from Tlaquiltenango, Morelos; Uriel Chávez Mendoza, from Apatzingán, Michoacán; José Luis Madrigal, from Numarán, Michoacán; Juan Hernández Ramírez, from Aquila, Michoacán; Francisco Flores Mezano, from Tancoco, Veracruz; Feliciano Álvarez Mesino, from Cuetzala del Progreso, Guerrero; Ricardo Gallardo Cardona, from Soledad de Graciano Sánchez, San Luis Potosí, and Enoc Díaz Pérez, from Pueblo Nuevo Solistahuacán, Chiapas.

However, there was the breakdown of the doubt that the federal structure of the Government had not been touched by the perverse master of organized crime money ...

Editorial Advance of "The Licensed" courtesy of Harpercollins Mexico

Chapter 8

Felipe Calderón's mistake

"Tolerance becomes a crime when what is tolerated is evil".

"Thomas Mann."

That warning about García Luna that Javier Herrera Valles made to Felipe Calderón took place in February 2008, very in time for the president to take action on the matter, knowing the work without a direction that García Luna implemented first from the AFI and thenat the head of the SSP, and avoid the war that browse the country today.That failed security strategy, which threw a balance of 102 thousand 861 people killed between 2006 and 2012, was palpable in the lack of direction and intelligence of the PFP in the first three actions with the operations Michoacán, Guerrero and Nuevo León-Tamaulipas,All ordered by García Luna at the beginning of the Calderonist sexennium.

Herrera Valles says that these operations were disastrous and without good results, because they did not have prior intelligence work and privileged media resonance, in addition to other technical errors, such as the fact that many of the police elements that participated, which were addedof the Intelligence Coordination, they were not included in the official collective license for the carrying of weapons.Even when many commanders observed such irregularities, no one dared to say something, because this was the lawyer.So I was used to working.

Jail as payment

The fear that García Luna infused his subordinates was due not only to his impulsive and vindictive character, but also to his high degree of influence on the presidential figure.This fear was not exclusive to the controls of the PFP: outside that environment there were first level officials in state governments who were dreading to confront García Luna.One of those officials was Alfredo Castillo Cervantes, which is already saying, being himself a man of possessive and answering character;First as an advisor to the attorney Rafael Macedo de la Concha - from 2002 to 2005 -, then as a regional control deputy, criminal procedures and PGR amparo - from 2005 to 2010 - and still as a justice attorney for the State of Mexico - of 2010To 2012 -, Castillo Cervantes always expressed to his closest circle his fear of contradicting García Luna.

That is why it is understood that, when in 2006 the beginning of the war against the narco was poorofficial.According to Herrera Valles - who, as reported in the previous chapter, paid with discredit, persecution and prison the signaling to García Luna -, the Michoacán operation, the first of the war against the narco, was a fiasco, because it predictedThe announcement in the media to the surprise factor against the criminal groups, whose main objectives to be dismantled were the Knights Templar and the Michoacan family.

About 15 days after being appointed head of the SSP, García Luna ordered, on December 16, 2006, a deployment in Michoacán with 200 elements of the PFP, supported with 40 patrols, under the direction of Commander Alejandro Romero.By direct orders of Genaro García Luna, they concentrated in the city of Morelia "for the photo", instead of being sent directly to review points on roads and roads of the State in order to intercept the groups of criminals who, sinceThen, they had full control of Michoacan geography and population.This decision eliminated the surprise factor and affected the results of the federal support forces (army and navy) that participated in the start of the operation, which ended without the capture of any importance of importance for the national security strategy, announced with hypeand saucer in the national and local media.

The tactical error committed in Michoacán was repeated on January 14, 2007 at the Guerrero operation.García Luna ordered again the deployment of 200 PFP troops, three helicopters and 40 patrol vehicles, to which 100 elements of the intelligence coordination were added - which were not included in the official collective license to carry weapons - and 630 troopsof the Navy and the Army.As in Michoacán, at the beginning of the Guerrero operation, the actions were announced through the national and local press;Then the deployment was made in search of criminal cells, whose official objective was the disarticulation of the Beltrán Leyva.

Perhaps that official objective has been just the reason why the error was intentionally repeated, since 2007 was the year the collaboration links between García Luna and the Beltrán Leyva, who, as already described,They maneuvered through Sergio Villarreal Barragán, El Grande, so that Calderón Hinojosa designated García Luna as head of the SSP.

Herrera Valles was right: the deployment of the Guerrero operation achieved a poor result in her start.Despite its logistical and economic cost, only stolen vehicles were recovering and a couple of cases of pedophilia.

VIDEO: El ‘Licenciado’ revela la complicidad del ex presidente de México, Felipe Calderón y el narco

As if the failures in Michoacán and Guerrero had not been enough to understand that the strategy needed more intelligence than media campaign, in February 2007 the error was repeated when implementing the Nuevo León-Tamaulipas operation.Again, without address or intelligence work to locate the objectives to be captured, García Luna, ”said Herrera Valles - ordered that hundreds of federal police be removed from the inspection, verification and surveillance points of the whole country and concentrate on Monterreyand Ciudad Victoria, with the purpose of attending the media campaign.

The measure did not produce great results in front of the cells of the Gulf and Los Zetas cartels;Rather, it led an increase in accidents and assaults on the roads of the rest of the country, which suddenly ran out of surveillance.All police officers, including AFI agents, dedicated to the safety of Mexicans, ”said Herrera Valles - were destined for urban patrol work and AFI support, increasing the cateos to hundreds and perhaps thousands of homes in themain municipalities of Nuevo León and Tamaulipas, with very few achievements.By contrast, as happened in Guerrero and Michoacán, executions and struggles between cartels were increased alarmingly, mainly in the locations where they maintained a constant presence.

The official figures speak for themselves about the bloodbath that meant for Michoacán, Guerrero, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas the commissioning of the war against the narco, without direction or intelligence strategy.Only in 2007, according to the statistics of the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (SESNSP), 10,253 people were executed throughout the national territory, somehow related to disputes and revenge among criminal organizations.Of those executions, 18 percent concentrated on the four entities that García Luna chose to launch the national strategy, which the media promoted as an efficient plan.

In Michoacán, 527 murders linked to narco were recorded during the first year of "war";In Guerrero there were 800;In Nuevo León, 285, while in Tamaulipas, 265 executions of civilians were reached, mostly as part of the dispute between criminal groups;However, others died in clashes with federal forces.On the side of the Federal Police (PF) there were also casualties: in 2007 there were 11 police officers during clashes, while another 32 were killed when they were out of service.

Although García Luna's bad decisions have already pushed the country towards a spiral of violence, through the media all his team applauded the decision of the frontal fight, perhaps for fear or complicity with him, denying that it was treatedof a war, but rather of an elaborate task to pacify the country.This, knowing the background of the management of Fox Quesada, in which García Luna led the AFI, whose balance was 74,631 people killed.

García Luna's applauders and the war against drugFor the Cisen, then in the AFI and later in the SSP: Francisco Javier Garza Palacios, Armando Espinoza de Benito, Édgar Millán Gómez, Facundo Rosas, Héctor Sánchez Gutiérrez, Luis Cárdenas Palomino, Roberto Velazco Bravo, Aristeo Gómez Martínez, Édgar Bayardo delVillar, Igor Labastida Calderón, Ramón Eduardo Little García, Roberto Cruz Aguilar González, Víctor Garay Cadena, Luis Manuel Becerril Mina, Francisco Javier Gómez Meza, Mario Velarde Martínez, Luis Jaffet Jasso Rodríguez and Francisco Navarro Espinoza.

Of all these, it was only unharmed of accusations Héctor Sánchez Gutiérrez, who was in charge of the Division of Federal Support forces.The others, either because they executed them, imprisoned them or simply mentioned witnesses such as Villarreal Barragán - the 'big'— and Valdez Villarreal - La' Barbie'—, reached them the framework of corruption and complicity that García Luna structured with theHeads of the Sinaloa and Beltrán Leyva cartels.

The police promoters against the narco, such as Millán Gómez, head of the division of judicial and ministerial commandments;Velazco Bravo, director of intelligence against organized crime;Gómez Martínez, Chief of the General Staff of the PFP;Bayardo del Villar, Operations Inspector of the PFP, and Igor Labastida Calderón, commander of the PFP, were executed, as previously narrated.His murders never clarified completely.

For his part, Gómez Meza, former director of the Puente Grande prison, was criminally prosecuted in October 2010 for his collaboration with the Sinaloa Cartel.Roberto Cruz Aguilar González, who was director of regulations and support for operations of the PFP, was convicted of the crime of drug trafficking in April 2010, after being in possession 12 kilograms of cocaine, weapons and cartridges, in the company of four other detainees—Terres of them police, "José Luis García Meléndez and Alejandro Cruz Ruiz Manrique, agents of the State of the State of Mexico;Jaqueline Miriam Chanes Salas, PF agent;and the civilian Julio César Ruiz Manrique.

Jasso Rodríguez, an operational agent assigned under the command of the PF, was arrested in June 2010 for leading a band dedicated to car theft, which were delivered to the Beltrán Leyva to transport drugs;Garay Cadena, who happened as a commissioner of the PFP to Millán Gómez after his death, and Navarro Espinoza, commander of the federal support forces of the PFP, were apprehended in November 2008.They were accused of allowing the activities of the Beltrán Leyva and charged the crimes of robbery and organized crime.Navarro Espinoza was imprisoned for a few weeks;Garay Cadena spent four years in the federal jail of Nayarit.In November 2012, the Second Unitary Court of the Twenty Circuit dismissed the charges against Garay Cadena, but he was no longer allowed to be reinstated in the PFP.

As for Becerril Mina, once director of Intervention and Logistic Support of the AFI, he was arrested in November 2010 when, under the protection of Nayarit Public Security Secretary, Édgar Veytia - currently sentenced to 20 years in prison in the United States byHis links with the Dámaso López Núñez cartel - was director of Public Security in the municipality of Bahía de Banderas.According to the protected witnesses of the PGR identified as "Claudia" and "Mateo", Becerril Mina allowed the operation of López Núñez, the ‘Lic’, after having been a collaborator of the Beltrán Leyva in the State of Mexico.In November 2011 a new criminal process was opened, this time for money laundering.

The meeting of the ‘king’ with the ‘graduate’

In the versions that Villarreal Barragán disseminated during his stay in Puente Grande.Villarreal Barragán said that Garza Palacios was a "multiple contact", because on the one hand "he helped the Cartel of the Northern Valley of Colombia to expand his presence in Mexico" and, on the other, it was one of García's trusted men of GarciaLuna, after “helped him establish the first approaches with Jesús Zambada García”, the 'King', emissary brother of 'May', head of the Sinaloa Cartel.

Villarreal Barragán explained that Garza Palacios met the 'King' in mid -1994 in Colombia, when, after the death of Pablo Escobar Gaviria, the 'patron', which occurred on December 2, 1993, the Sinaloa cartel sought new contacts that supplyCocaine supply.The meeting happened in Cali during a party offered by the brothers Gilberto and Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela, which José Santacruz Londoño and Hélmer Herrera Buitrago also attended, who already led the so -called Cali cartel, the criminal organization that inherited - by dying Escobar Gaviria- The millionaire cocaine traffic business towards Mexico and the United States.

From that moment, Villarreal Barragán continued, the relationship between the ‘King’ and Garza Palacios, who at that time was just one more element was born.In the end it was the necessary contact of the Sinaloa Cartel to infiltrate a sector of the Colombian Police and, thus, facilitate the constant cocaine supply to Mexico.The link between them became friendship when in 2000 Garza Palacios arrived in Mexico to join the newly created AFI, coordinated by García Luna.This was the first contact that the Sinaloa cartel had within that security corporation.

According to Villarreal Barragán, Garza Palacios allowed the first meeting between the ‘King’ and García Luna, which took place in the late 2000s in a restaurant in Mexico City.The then head of the AFI received the Sinaloense Capo with five million dollars that the ‘May’ sent him as payment to help the escape of Guzmán Loera de Puente Grande.After the successful first leak of the ‘Chapo’, Garza Palacios was included in the payroll of the Sinaloa Cartel, whose payment was made by the ‘Lic’.

The imputations of Villarreal Barragán against Garza Palacios - who reiterated in the Galeras de Puente Grande when returning from the court where they deposited them before a federal judge - were not the only ones who pointed out the role of this Colombian in the corruption framework of García Luna.In November 2012, Valdez Villarreal, the ‘Barbie’, former subaltern de Villarreal Barragán with the Beltrán Leyva, sent a letter from prison to the newspaper Reforma.* As a climax to the six -year of Calderón Hinojosa, the 'Barbie' explained that Garza Palacios, as well as García Luna, Espinoza de Benito, Cárdenas Palomino, Millán Gómez, Labastida Calderón, Rosas Rosas, small García and Garay Cadena, received money from the cartel ofThe Beltrán Leyva brothers, through him, so he emphasized that they were part at that time "of the criminal structure of this country".

I try to gather the narco summit

There they did not stop the comments of the ‘Barbie’: he declared a political imprison for not having accepted the alignment conditions with the SSP to integrate a single cartel nationwide, and added that he was subject to persecution in direct order of Calderón Hinojosa.He publicly denounced that the president's intention was to reach an agreement with all drug cartels, so he appointed General Mario Arturo Acosta Chaparro and the Secretary of the Interior, Juan Camilo Mouriño, to meet with the main capos.

The letter of the 'Barbie' abounded: “Various meetings were made through General Mario Arturo Acosta Chaparro, who met on the orders of President [Calderón] and Juan Camilo Mouriño [Secretary of the Interior] with two of the heads of the familyMichoacana.Subsequently, the general met in Matamoros with Heriberto Lazcano and Miguel Ángel Treviño, ‘El Z-40’.Some time later, Acosta Chaparro and Mouriño met with Arturo Beltrán Leyva, ‘El Barbas’, and also met with ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán, leader of the Sinaloa Cartel ”.

This same version, with some variations in form, but not in the background, was also cited by the 'Grande', who said that García Luna entrusted him in mid -2010 for the presidential order to dialogue with the heads of the country's main cartels,In order to achieve urgent peace in the face of the overflow of violence generated by the Calderonist administration itself.He, with the authorization of Arturo Beltrán Leyva, said he accepted the parcel made by the federal government;He gave the task of "organizing a summit to sit the dialogue to the main drug traffickers with the Mexican government dome".

Supported by Héctor Beltrán Leyva, the first action of the 'Grande' to pacify the country, as asked by the head of the SSP, was to cease the war held by the Beltrán Leyva and Los Zetas for the control of Coahuila, Nuevo León and Quintana Roo.According to the 'Grande', the unilateral truce made in front of Los Zetas was reflected in the official statistics: the SESNSP recorded from January to August 2010, before the dialogue with the cartels was attempted, an average of one thousand 676 monthly executions in all the country.After the truce unilaterally decreed, only of these two criminal groups, the index in September of that year fell to 1,662, almost 0.9 percent.The decrease in murders was more evident in the states they had - and they still have - the Zetas presence.

These figures suggest that the ‘big’ did not boast in its version.Something of true were in their sayings: the attempts of pacification, which ended on September 12, 2010 with their arrest in the city of Puebla, were also reflected in a decrease in the homicide statistics of Coahuila, Nuevo León and Quintana Roo.According to the SESNSP, Coahuila went from having a monthly average of 31 executions to 19 in September 2010;Nuevo León, 72 executions to 60;Quintana Roo, from 20 to 12.

Villarreal Barragán began to contact the main leaders of the narco throughout the national territory with the purpose of materializing the summit towards December 2010.But, before that, García Luna wanted to underpin the plan holding at least one notable decrease in homicide rates for September 15 of that year, occasion when Felipe Calderón would boast of his nationalism celebrating the CC Anniversary of the beginning of independence.

The strategy used, according to the former head of security of the Beltrán Leyva, was simple: in the states where the Beltrán Leyva maintained a preponderant presence, began to capture members of the enemy cartels.He did not execute them, as was his custom;He only kidnapped them to send them to the chiefs of those cartels the message of peace through the dialogue offered by the federal government.According to the 'Grande', between May and August 2010, he forgave the life of more than 300 hitmen in exchange for the proposal of a meeting with him, prior to an encounter with the head of the SSP, García Luna, and the president, Calderón Hinojosa.

The message sent, he said, had the endorsement of the Secretary of National Defense, General Guillermo Galván, who through García Luna offered all kinds of security guarantees, including that the capos or those who accompanied them would not be arrestedThe appointment, whose headquarters initially proposed to be Acapulco, Guerrero, or Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco.The idea was to be held in the first half of August, before the celebrations of the Centenary of the Revolution and the Bicentennial of the beginning of Independence, but the slowness of the exchange of messages forced to reprogram it for the second half of December 2010.

The first summoned, after sending messages with the captures of members of their cells in Coahuila, Guanajuato, Jalisco, State of Mexico, Morelos and Quintana Roo, were Jesús Méndez Vargas - the 'Chango'—, Servando Gómez Martínez - La'Tuta'— and Nazario Moreno González —el 'chayo'—, heads of the Michoacan family;and Ismael Zambada García - the ‘May'—, Juan José Esparragoza Moreno —el‘ Azul'— and Joaquín Guzmán Loera - the ‘Chapo'—, of the Sinaloa Cartel.

Then, under the same and effective method, they were "invited" Heriberto Lazcano (the ‘Lazca’) and Miguel Ángel Treviño Morales (the ‘Z-40 '), then chiefs of Los Zetas;Vicente Carrillo Fuentes (the ‘Viceroy’) and Vicente Carrillo Leyva (the ‘Engineer’), brother and son, respectively, by Amado Carrillo Fuentes (the ‘Lord of the Skies’), which led the Juarez Cartel;Eduardo Costilla Sánchez (the ‘Coss’) and José Antonio Cárdenas Martínez (the ‘Accountant’), of the Gulf Cartel;And, finally, Luis Fernando Sánchez Arellano (also nicknamed the 'engineer') and Enedina Arellano Félix (the 'narcomami'), whose leadersAugust 2006.

On the part of the Beltrán Leyva, said the 'Grande', he was willing to attend Héctor Beltrán Leyva, the 'H', despite the fact that the federal forces had killed Mansalva to his brother Arturo Beltrán Leyva, the 'beards', in aAlleged capture attempt registered in Cuernavaca, Morelos, on the afternoon of December 16, 2009, when it was delivered to the Navy by Valdez Villarreal, the 'Barbie', in exchange for an alleged agreement that would allow him to establish his own cartel.The betrayal of the 'Barbie' to the Beltrán Leyva was what made him openly confronJust when the 'big' summoned the Dialogue Summit meeting for La Paz.

Villarreal Barragán pointed out that all those who received the invitation from Calderón Hinojosa and García Luna responded affirmatively.The first to confirm its disposition to a formal pact was the Sinaloa Cartel.The ‘Chapo’ sent him a message with an emissary, who was also captured in Nayarit by a group of the Beltrán Leyva and his life was forgave.In his message, he told the ‘big’ - more words, less words - that he agreed with a meeting with the chiefs of the other cartels to end the war that had become generalized throughout the country.Without knowing the conditions offered by the government apparatus, the peace pact accepted in the first instance.The ‘Chapo’, speaking in the name of the Sinaloa cartel, only put a condition before.

In the same terms, the ‘Chango’, leader of the Michoacan family answered.He asked that he be allowed to operate freely in all Michoacán and that he was not charged right to floor on the drug transfer route from the northern part of that entity to the border of Tijuana and Mexicali, Baja California.In return, he offered to share, without a claim of collection law, the port of Lázaro Cárdenas, the main gateway to the country of amphetamines from the Southeast Asia and Cocaine from Colombia.The ‘Chango’ expressed these proposals to Villarreal Barragán, as an emissary of the Federal Government, at a meeting they held in Puebla, the Operations Center of the ‘Grande’, where he settled after the death of Arturo Beltrán Leyva.

For his part, Heriberto Lazcano spoke on behalf of Los Zetas without making any entry offer.In a telephone conversation, he expressed to ‘great’ his willing.And he asked him that at the meeting there were only those who make decisions.He added that he was not willing to have to wait days to an answer to assert the agreements.The mood of ‘Lazca’, ”Villarreal Barragán said - changed totally when he knew that at that meeting would be the president of Mexico himself."Then count on me," said the head of the Zetas.

Who did show reluctance for the meeting was the ‘Viceroy’, of the Juarez Cartel.Input he refused to the possibility of a meeting for the dragged confrontation.He doubted that Villarreal Barragán was emissary of Calderón Hinojosa and García Luna.The dispute and distrust of the 'Viceroy' was based on the betrayal of the 'Grande' to the Juarez cartel when he joined the Beltrán Leyva brothers, after the alleged death of the 'lord of heaven', who, from the perspective ofVillarreal Barragán, “is not dead.He became a protected witness of the DEA and that is why he pretended his death ”in a hospital in Mexico City, during a surgical operation to modify the face.

The ‘Viceroy’ did not accept to attend the peak -top meeting.Beyond his animosity towards the ‘Great’, he had another reason: he was going to attend the ‘Chapo’, who was attributed to the murder of his brother Rodolfo Carrillo Fuentes, the ‘Golden Child’;Actually, a PFP group had executed it as a special favor that the ‘Great’ asked ‘La Voz’, the communications link between García Luna and El Narco.

He also refused to participate in the Costilla meeting, the ‘Coss’, of the Gulf Cartel.His claim was a lot.He put as the only condition that he was not invited Heriberto Lazcano, the ‘Lazca’, of Los Zetas.The break between this fraction and the Gulf Cartel was still fresh, which occurred in mid -2009, when the 'Lazca' began to operate freely, with the support of the Northern Cartel of the Valley of Colombia, snatching the Gulf a greatPart of the control of the routes in Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz and Tamaulipas, still used by the two cartels to introduce cocaine from Cancun from Colombia destined for the United States.

The ‘Grande’ chose to take advantage of the disposition of ‘Lazca’ and privileged the presence of Los Zetas before the Gulf Cartel at the meeting called.In addition, the 'great' clarified that he always had greater empathy with the 'Lazca', because Costilla Sánchez "was superb and felt 'the king of the world', as if he really deserved it, when he was always a 'cat' ofOsiel Cárdenas Guillén: It was the Pilmama of Antonio Cárdenas Guillén ['Tony storm'] since he was a policeman in Matamoros ”.The ‘Great’ was always expressed with respect to Heriberto Lazcano, who said: "He was a brave bastard, who had forged in the chingadazos".On more than one occasion, at least in the talks in prison, he ended up recognizing his talent "for the drug business".

With the Arellano Félix there was no problem: the message Enedina Arellano replied that he would go to the event where the federal government decided.More than the country's pacification, the 'narcomami' was interested, the 'Menso', which purged a six -year penalty in the United States (later he was killed in 2013);Francisco Javier, the ‘Tigrillo’, sentenced to life imprisonment, also in the USA.UU, and Benjamin, the ‘Min’, imprisoned in Almoloya and at that time waiting to be extradited to the United States, where in 2012 he was issued a sentence of 22 years in prison.

García Luna was informed step by step of the meeting entrusted to ‘Grande’.Even by disposition of the head of the SSP, one million dollars were sent to each of the chiefs of the cartels that agreed to sit in the dialogue, “as a show of gratitude for the answer, and as a courtesy for each oneof those interested will organize their own mobilization scheme ”.García Luna offered to reimburse that money, which initially came from the Beltrán Leyva Stockwear.

Finally, the meeting between the heads of the main drug cartels and the government's dome was never held.The reason was that Villarreal Barragán, the emissary of García Luna in this task, arrested him in the city of Puebla on September 12, 2010, just in the middle of the organization of the summit.His arrest was the work of the DEA and a group of navy elements that worked away from the influence of the Secretary of Public Security, given the distrust that was awakening to the United States government.At that time, García Luna was already mentioned as a narco facilitator in at least half a hundred previous inquiries.

The ‘Great’ attributed its capture to an action of the Navy, derived from a confusion.He never thought that those who were looking for him were agents of the DEA, after the United States Department of the Treasury applied against him, on June 1, 2010, the Kingpin Law, which prohibits commercial transactions of individuals or companies with drug traffickers.One day before his arrest, he said, met with Héctor Beltrán Leyva, the ‘H’, who warned him that the Secretary of the Interior was looking for, at that time Francisco Blake Mora.Both thought, in the words of the ‘big’, that it was a personal meeting to talk about the summit preparations.The ‘H’ told ‘Grande’ that a group of police would look for him at his home in Puebla and take him to the appointment with Blake Mora.

That is why he did not make any defense attempt when the sailors arrived at his home the next morning.The ‘big’ supposed they would escort him until the presence of the Secretary of the Interior.At the time of detention he was accompanied by at least 30 armed men who would have repelled the military presence, but the ‘great’ ordered anyone to do anything.Even so, none of his escorts released his weapons.The sailors, he said, in a “Men's Pact, they only took‘ El Grande ’” - he liked to speak referring to himself in the third person—.

It was not until he was handcuffed when the ‘big’ understood that it was not an invitation to talk with the Secretary of the Interior.He described that the blood froze at the moment when two agents "that half spoke Spanish" passed their digital footprints on a laptop.When his face and name appeared on the screen, he knew that his criminal career was over.The first thing he asked for as soon as they stripped him of his gun and a credential of the presidential staff he carried - who had given him a long ago the senator Guillermo Anaya Llamas - was to speak with “Mr. García Luna”.But that was not possible.He communicated with him until he was transferred to the PGR facilities.Although his treatment was shear, he remained within the collaboration agreement.

The ‘Grande’ said that García Luna promised not to leave him in a Mexican prison.That would look for ways to achieve extradition to the United States.And the graduate fulfilled his word: days after being held at the Puente Grande prison, the director of this, Francisco Javier Gómez Meza, informed Villarreal Barragán who was still standing for the arrangement to get him out of that prison.To do this, he asked him to declare himself protected from the PGR in order to facilitate the treatment with the US.UU;This was done by the ‘big’ at the end of September 2010.Although they extradited it to the United States until May 23, 2012, during all that time García Luna ordered him to be given a privileged imprisonment.